Abstract. This paper introduces certified sets to the private set intersection problem. A private set intersection protocol allows Alice and Bob to jointly compute the set intersection function without revealing their input sets. Since the inputs are private, malicious participants may choose their sets arbitrarily and may use this flexibility to affect the result or learn more about the input of an honest participant. With certified sets, a trusted party ensures the inputs are valid and binds them to each participant. The strength of the malicious model with certified inputs increases the applicability of private set intersection to real world problems. With respect to efficiency the new certified set intersection protocol improves existing malicious model private set intersection protocols by a constant factor.
Introduction
The problem of private set intersection is the following. Alice and Bob hold sets S A and S B , respectively. They would like to jointly compute the intersection, in such a way that reveals as little as possible about S A to Bob and S B to Alice. In other words, both Alice and Bob should learn S A ∩ S B but nothing more.
While this task could be completed with general secure multiparty techniques, it is far more efficient to have a dedicated protocol, especially since the number of communication rounds will be constant. A number of such protocols exist in the literature. A problem common to all previous protocols is that the inputs S A and S B can be chosen arbitrarily by Alice and Bob. Our protocols allow Alice and Bob to use only certified sets, that is, sets which have been approved by a trusted party. The trusted party authorizes the set once for each party, then does not participate in the protocol.
We also consider a variant of private intersection, when A and B wish to compute the cardinality of the set intersection. This is referred to as the private intersection cardinality problem.
Private set intersection protocols may find applications in online recommendation services, medical databases, and many data related operations between companies, which may even be competitors. An example from the law enforcement field is given by Kissner and Song [22] ; suppose a law enforcement official has a list of suspects and would like to know if any of them are customers of a particular business. To protect the privacy of the other customers, and keep the list of suspects private, the business and the law use a private set intersection protocol to learn only those names appearing on both lists.
Motivation for certified private sets. The goal of certifying the private sets of participants is to restrict their inputs to "sensible" or "appropriate" inputs. This reduces the strength of a malicious participant.
Suppose Bob is malicious in the following sense; he follows the protocol, but wishes to learn as much about S A as possible. Bob's strategy is to populate a set S B with all of his best guesses for S A and to have |S B | be as large as Alice will allow. This maximizes the amount of information Bob learns about S A .
In the extreme case, Bob may claim S B contains all possible elements, which will always reveal S A . He may also vary his set over multiple runs of the protocol, in order to learn more information over time. These attacks are even more powerful when the protocol can be executed anonymously. Note that all this behaviour is permitted in any model which allows the participants to choose their inputs arbitrarily.
The weakness of models which allow arbitrary inputs reduces the practicality of private set operations. The following examples are made possible by the use of certified private sets. A certification authority (CA) is a trusted party who certifies that each participant's set is valid. Once the sets are certified, the CA need not be online. For example, suppose companies want to perform set operations on their financial data. Each company uses a different, but trusted, accounting firm who certifies the data. The companies can then perform as many operations with as many other companies with their certified data.
Since our approach to certifying sets shares a lot with anonymous credentials, this area may also benefit from our work. Credential holders may treat values in their certificates as sets, and intersect them. For example, two pseudonymous/anonymous users may intersect their credentials to determine they live in the same city and were born in the same year. As another example, they may determine whether their ages are within y years by intersecting sets of integers {age − y, . . . , age, . . . , age + y}, where age is the certified value from the credential. This facilitates privacy-enhanced social networking.
Credential holders may also prove things such as at "I satisfy at least two of the following five conditions". This is effected by privately intersecting the credential with a list of the conditions. The two satisfied conditions may be revealed (by using set intersection) or kept private (by using set intersection cardinality).
This work may also find applications in revocation strategies for anonymous services. The revocation list is private and certified to maintain the privacy of revoked users. When an anonymous user authenticates, their singleton set (their certified ID) is intersected with the revocation list. If the user has been revoked, the intersection contains their ID, otherwise the service provider is assured they are not on the revocation list. Using an intersection cardinality protocol would keep the ID hidden and only reveal whether the user was on the list or not. Since the revocation list is certified, the user is assured that the server does not populate it arbitrarily, to de-anonymize users.
Certified sets are also useful in the suspect-list example of Kissner and Song. Privacy conscious businesses will only reveal information about customers when law enforcement has a warrant for such information (signed by a judge). In this case, the judge digitally signs the list of suspect names for the law enforcement agent. This convinces the business owner that information is only being revealed in accordance with a warrant. On the other hand, the business may also get their customer list certified by a credit card company, bank or tax authority to convince the law enforcement agency that the list is complete and contains valid names.
Related Problems. A number of previously studied problems in the literature are similar to private set intersection. We list them to point out how they differ from the current problem.
A secret handshake protocol allows Alice and Bob to confirm that they are both members of the same group (a spy agency, for example). At the end of the protocol, both Alice and Bob learn that either they are both members of the group, or nothing at all. This problem can be viewed as private set intersection (or intersection cardinality) with sets of size one.
The socialist millionaires' problem is very similar; two parties would like to determine whether they have the same amount of money, or no information if they have different amounts of money [4] . This problem can also be solved by private intersection of singleton sets, and benefits from certification. The bank of each party may certify the balance, ensuring that one may only run the protocol with their true amount of money.
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows Alice to query a database held by Bob, without revealing her query. Alice may make queries for any item of the database and learn arbitrary blocks of it, independent of the set she holds. In a weak model where Alice is trusted to only query for items which belong to her set, PIR could implement private set intersection. As we have argued, many applications of set intersection require security in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol which allows Alice to transfer one of two items to Bob, such that Bob can choose which item he wants, keep his choice hidden from Alice, and learn nothing about the other item. OT can be used to construct private set intersection protocols (see [15] ) however these are less efficient than specialized protocols, and efficiency decreases when elements are chosen from larger domains.
Finally, password-based key exchange allows two users who share a lowentropy password to establish a strong shared key. This protocol should fail if the passwords are different, and therefore bears similarity to the private intersection problem with sets of size one. However, the security requirements and definitions are quite different due to the differing goals of the two protocols.
Contributions and Outline. Our new protocol boasts the following features. The protocol (described in Section 6) may output the intersection or the intersection cardinality, and in either case both parties learn the output. Certified sets, which are the inputs to the protocol, are presented in Section 5. Participants can use different certifying authorities, provided both parties trust the authorities. We prove security in the strongest model in the literature, malicious participants with certified inputs. The model is described in Section 2, and the security proof appears in Appendix A. A strategy for adding fairness in the presence of participants which may abort the protocol prematurely is given in Section 6.4. With respect to computational complexity, the number of arithmetic operations is comparable to existing non-certified methods, however the dominant operations occur in a group with a significantly faster operation. The amount of communication is comparable to previous approaches as well, but again, each communicated element is smaller due to the choice of group. Efficiency is discussed in Section 7. Section 3 will provide background related to the protocol, and Section 4 reviews related protocols from the literature. An explicit description of the zero knowledge protocols used is given in Appendix B.
Model and Definition
We work in a stronger version of what is generally called the malicious model, and we focus on the two-party case. The malicious model is formally defined in the book of Goldreich [17, §7.2] . In our case we will have the participants, who hold sets they wish to intersect, and the certification authorities CAs. We assume the CAs will be honest.
In the malicious model, either participant may behave arbitrarily, while privacy is maintained for the honest participant. Limitations of this model are (i) security is only guaranteed when one participant is assumed honest, (ii) we cannot prevent parties from aborting the protocol, and (iii) inputs to the protocol may be arbitrary. We will lift limitation (iii) by allowing only certified sets as inputs.
We discuss ways to mitigate unfairness due to aborts in Section 7.4 by applying optimistic fair-exchange protocols [1] . Using these techniques, if one party aborts prematurely, we are guaranteed that both parties learn the same amount of information.
The Ideal Functionality. In the ideal functionality for the private intersection of certified sets a trusted party U will perform the intersection. Essentially, certification authorities will inform U of the a participant's certified set, then two parties signal U that they wish to compute the intersection of their sets. We now describe these steps in greater detail.
Certify: Upon receiving a message (Certify, S Pi , P i , CA j ) from CA j , U records that CA j has certified the set S Pi for use in the protocol by participant P i .
IdealProtocol:
The message N = (IdealProtocol, P i , P j ) from P i , indicates that P i would like to run the protocol with P j . Upon receiving N from P i , if U has received (IdealProtocol, P j , P i ) the IdealProtocol begins, otherwise N is stored and U waits. If U has not received (Certify, S Pi , P i , * ), CA Pi is set to null and S Pi is set to ∅ before IdealProtocol begins. U behaves analogously if it has not received (Certify, S Pj , P j , * ). At each step, after receiving output from U each party must respond with either "ok" to continue the protocol, or "abort" to end the protocol at this point. This is required to model limitation (ii) above, and to allow participants to abort if they do not trust the CA of the other participant.
Here we describe the IdealProtocol between participants A and B.
(b) A responds ok or abort.
Simulation and trusted CAs. In order to simulate the protocol against malicious adversaries, the simulator must know which CAs the honest participant trusts. Without this information the malicious party may distinguish interaction with the simulator from interaction with the honest party since the simulator would not be able to consistently reject the same CAs as the honest participant. Since the list of CAs trusted by a participant is not considered private information, we assume that honest participants make the list public.
Remark 1.
A and B should agree to use authorities they both trust before approaching U , since B may learn |S A | before A can decide that CA B is untrustworthy (if B is malicious he may learn |S A | and abort). Since the "role" of the participant in the protocol is not specified, we simply assume that the first person to send the IdealProtocol message will play the role of A in the description of IdealProtocol. If a participant has multiple sets (and/or multiple certifying authorities) these are handled by a associating a different identity to each set, for example A||set1, A||set2, etc.
The real world model. In the real world there is no trusted party U , and participants are polynomial time algorithms, initialized with public keys of the CAs as required. A malicious participant may follow any polynomial time strategy.
Remark 2. An honest participant will abort if any deviation from the protocol is detected. Adversarial behaviour can thus serve to accomplish three outcomes.
1. Learning more about the other party's set than what is allowed in the ideal model.
With the definitions of the real and ideal models in place, we can now give a precise definition of a secure certified private intersection protocol. Definition 1. Let A and B * be parties holding sets S A and S B * from a domain D, certified by CA A , CA B * respectively. Without loss of generality, B * may behave arbitrarily (real-world adversary). Let Π be a private set intersection protocol, and D be the joint distribution of the outputs of A and B * from Π when CA A and CA B * are honest. Π is a secure certified private intersection protocol if a there exists a simulator (ideal-world adversary) which is given black-box access to B * such that D is computationally indistinguishable from the joint output distribution of the simulator and A in the ideal world.
Models for computing the intersection cardinality. A slightly modified ideal model applies to private computation of the intersection cardinality with certified sets. In the description above, Steps 3 and 4 are replaced by the single step "U sends |S A ∩ S B | to B". The real world model is unchanged.
Background
In this section we give the building blocks and notation we will use. The notation x ∈ R X denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from the set X. We use {0, 1} to represent the set of all binary strings of length , as well as the set [0, 2 − 1] of integers. The notation ± {0, 1} is used for the set [−2 + 1, 2 − 1].
Zero Knowledge Proofs
When presenting protocols we express zero knowledge (ZK) proofs using notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [5] , which allows the aim of proof protocols to be described without giving all details. In short, the notation PK {(x, y, . . .) : statements involving x, y, . . .} means the prover is proving knowledge of (x, y, . . .) such that these values satisfy statements. The types of statements are knowledge of, relations between, and the length of discrete logarithms.
The realization of the proofs of knowledge described above may be done in a variety of ways, each requiring different amounts of interaction and security assumptions. For the security of our protocol, we require that all ZK proofs be efficiently simulated. A protocol for concurrent ZK which may be simulated is given by Damgård [9] . The protocol uses the public key of a third party as the auxiliary string. In the protocols we present, since the CAs public key must be known by both A and B, it may be used as the auxiliary string. Replacing the verifier in a three-move ZK proof by a hash function gives a non-interactive ZK proof of knowledge [13] . Since it is non-interactive, there are no concurrency issues, and simulation is possible in the random oracle model.
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [7] signs L-tuples of strings from {0, 1} m . Given a signature on a tuple of elements, we may efficiently prove possession of a signature on some or all elements in the tuple. Further, this proof may be completed without revealing the signature itself.
We now describe a basic version of the scheme, where the signer learns all of the messages. In Section 5 we discuss possible applications of the signer's ability to sign tuples where some of the messages are hidden. A number of length related security parameters are used in the CL-signature scheme. For details on how they are chosen, see [7] .
Key generation For a security parameter n , choose an n -bit RSA modulus n = pq, where p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, p and q are prime. Choose uniformly at random R 1 , . . . , R L , S, Z from the group of quadratic residues mod n. The public key is (n, R 1 , . . . , R L , S, Z) and the secret key is (p, q). Signing algorithm. On input m 1 , . . . , m L , the signer chooses at random a prime e of length e > m + 2, and a random number v of length v = n + m + ∅ , where ∅ is a security parameter. Compute
The signature is (A, e, v).
m i ∈ ± {0, 1} m , and 2 e −1 < e < 2 e . Proof of possession. This proof assumes the prover wishes to keep all messages hidden. Let H be a security parameter. Choose r ∈ R {0, 1} n+ ∅ , and randomize the signature (A, e, v) as (A = AS −r (mod n), e, v = v + er). The randomized signature is communicated to the verifier and the prover asserts:
The first predicate convinces the verifier that the signature is in fact valid, while the second and third prove that it is well formed with respect to the system parameters. For details of how the interval checks on e and the m i are realized, see [7] (this proof is also given in more detail as the part of the protocol in Appendix B). Security of the CL-signature scheme relies on the strong RSA (SRSA) assumption, see [7] for details of this assumption and a security proof. The proof of possession as stated is of limited utility, it merely asserts that the holder has a signature on some tuple of correctly formed messages. However, we will compose this proof with one to show that certain operations were completed using the signed values. This will allow A and B to prove that only signed values are used in the intersection protocol.
Homomorphic Encryption
We also review two homomorphic encryption schemes used for private set intersection. Both are additively homomorphic, i.e. for two encryptions E(m 1
The Paillier Cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem [25] encrypts plaintexts from Z * n as ciphertexts in Z * n 2 . Security relies on the decisional composite residuosity assumption, which requires (as a minimum) that n be difficult to factor. For encryption, decryption and to operate on encrypted values requires arithmetic mod n 2 . The cryptosystem is probabilistic, IND-CPA secure, and allows efficient proofs of plaintext knowledge, as well as multiplicative relationships on plaintexts [10] . We will largely treat Paillier encryption as a black box, or generic homomorphic encryption scheme with these properties, and do not describe the details of the system here.
A homomorphic Elgamal variant. Our new protocols will use a standard variant of Elgamal encryption [11] . Setup consists of choosing a cyclic group G of prime order q, such that the discrete log problem is difficult in G. The parameter q is the bitlength of q. Next choose a generator g ∈ G and the secret key x ∈ R Z * q . The public key is g, h = g x . To encrypt m, choose r ∈ R Z * q , and compute E(m) = (g r , g m h r ). The additive homomorphic property is easily verified. Efficient decryption is not possible; but to recognize an encryption of zero, given x, compute (g r ) −x (g m h r ) = g −rx g m+rx = g m , which is one precisely when m = 0. This test will be sufficient for our protocols, decryption will not be necessary.
As with Paillier, the scheme is probabilistic and IND-CPA secure. ZK proofs of plaintext knowledge are simply proofs of knowledge of discrete logs. It is worth noting that arithmetic in G will be significantly faster than in Z * n 2 for comparable levels of security and the ciphertexts will be smaller.
Verifiable Shuffles
A sub-protocol we use in our intersection cardinality protocol is a verifiable shuffle decryption. A verifiable shuffle of ciphertexts takes a list of ciphertexts e 1 , . . . , e k as input, and outputs a second list of ciphertexts E 1 , . . . , E k , which contain the same plaintexts in a permuted order. The public key of the e i , E i is the same. In a verifiable decryption, the decryptor proves that the decrypted values correspond to the ciphertexts without revealing the private key. A verifiable shuffle decryption is the combination, first the ciphertexts are shuffled, then decrypted and proof is given that the plaintexts correspond to input ciphertexts. The result of the operation is that the verifier does not learn which input ciphertexts correspond to which plaintexts, the permutation is kept secret.
One can simply combine a shuffle protocol (such the one of Groth and Ishai [18] ), with a proof of correct decryption, or one may use a combined protocol (such as the one of Furukawa [16] ). The combined method of Furukawa, which is specialized to Elgamal ciphertexts, requires 14k exponentiations and communication of approximately k group elements.
Existing Private Intersection and Cardinality Protocols
In this section we describe previously known protocols to solve the private set intersection problem (and variants).
The work of Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas (FNP) was the first to present the private set intersection problem, and protocols to solve it [15] . We will describe their design strategy in some detail, since it underlies most of the subsequent work on this topic (including our own). Throughout this paper, we assume that |S A | = |S B | = k to simplify presentation, however all of the protocols presented also work when |S A | = |S B |.
Suppose pk A is the public key of A for the Paillier cryptosystem (or a scheme providing similar features). Let R be a ring, R[x] be the polynomials with coefficients from R, and D be the domain to which S A and S B belong. We will require that |D|/|R| is negligible. First, A represents S A = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) as the roots of a degree
i , then encrypts the coefficients with pk A . These are then sent to B, who evaluates f at each b i ∈ S B homomorphically. The key observation is that f (b i ) = 0 if and only if
This simplified version of the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model. To cope with malicious parties, FNP give protocols to deal with the cases when A may be malicious, or when B may be malicious. They also sketch a strategy for combining the two to handle either A or B behaving maliciously. The protocol uses a cut-and-choose technique, which quickly becomes inefficient in both computation and communication as k grows.
Kissner and Song (KS) [22, 23] present improved protocols for more general set operations, as well as protocols for set operations in the multiparty case. We review the crux of their approach. Let s and t be randomly chosen polynomials in R[x] and f, g be polynomials representing sets S A , S B respectively, and deg s, t, f, g = k. The authors prove that sf + tg = gcd(f, g) · u, where u is a uniformly random element of R [x] . Combined with the condition that the domain D of S A and S B is very small compared to R, the chance that u contains an element from D as a root is low. Therefore the only elements of D which are roots of sf + tg are those in gcd(f, g) = S A ∩ S B . The parties jointly compute encryptions of sf + tg, then decrypt to learn the intersection. The advantage of this representation of S A ∩ S B is that it composes well with other operations, and handles more than two parties easily.
Their solution for two-party private set intersection, secure in the malicious model, has computation and communication complexity O(k 2 ). They do not present a protocol for the two party private intersection cardinality problem secure in the malicious model. We also note that their malicious model protocols require the use of Paillier encryption (or a homomorphic scheme with equivalent properties). Hohenberger and Weiss [20] provide protocols for a private disjointness test where A is semi-honest and B may be malicious, and a private intersection cardinality protocol in the semi-honest model. Their protocols are also based on the paradigm of FNP, but use the homomorphic Elgamal variant presented in §3, and rely on the ability to recognize encryptions of zero. Hazay and Lindell [19] give protocols for two party private set intersection using a novel approach based on oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation (instead of oblivious polynomial evaluation). The protocol is more efficient than previous solutions, however security is proven in a relaxed version of the malicious model. A further difference of this protocol with the one presented here is that the output is only learnt by one participant.
Finally, Kiayias and Mitrofanova [21] , and Ye et al. [27] provide protocols for a restricted version of private set intersection, the case when a single bit is output, indicating whether the intersection is non-empty. We omit details of these papers, since solutions to this problem are much less efficient than intersection and cardinality, and differ significantly from the present work.
Certified Sets
Here we describe the process a CA uses to certify a set for a participant. Once certified, the set may be used in the private set intersection protocol of Section 6. A discussion of the possibility of using certified sets with existing private set intersection protocols is available in [28] .
Certification will be done by the CA, who issues a CL-signature to the set holder A for the set S A = (a 1 , . . . , a k ). Given this signature (or certificate) A must be able to prove the following.
1. That encrypted coefficients correspond to the polynomial representation of a certified set. 2. That the set used in a computation is certified. 3. The size of the set.
Let S A be represented by the polynomial f (t) = k i=0 α i t i . The message space of the CL signature scheme used by the CA must have length k +1. We now present the method to certify the set S A . Our presentation assumes the homomorphic Elgamal scheme is used.
First, the CA signs the coefficients and the degree of the polynomial. Signing coefficients allows requirement 1 to be easily proven. During certification, the user sends S A , α 0 , . . . , α k to the CA. The CA checks whether α i are the coefficients of f (t) = a∈S A (t − a) and that S A is valid for the user. Then the CA issues two signatures, one on (k, α 1 , . . . , α k ) and one on (k, a 1 , . . . , a k ).
Proof that ciphertexts E i = (g ri , g αi h ri ) contain encryptions of certified coefficients is:
where proof that "α i are CL-signed" is done as described in §3.2. Proving that elements used in a computation are certified is easy; one simply proves that they are CL-signed. The size of the set |S A | = k is the first attribute in the signature and should be revealed and checked during proof.
In the case when the CA's public key has L > k + 1 bases, the elements corresponding to the additional bases are set to zero and ignored during the protocol.
Extensions. The authentication of set holders may also be included in the certification process, by including an identifier or pseudonym as the first value signed by the CA. During the first proof involving the signature, the holder may reveal or prove something about their identity. Preventing users from sharing their sets and signatures is not possible, but this problem has been studied in the context of anonymous credentials, see [6, 8] for some deterrents. Note that shared sets may not be combined to participate in the protocol with a larger set, the CL signature scheme prevents this.
Another possible extension is to allow users to keep some set elements hidden from the CA (since this feature is provided by the CL-signature scheme). This way some elements may remain completely private, while still preventing the user from changing their set, and limiting the size of the set.
New Certified Private Intersection Protocol
We now describe our new protocol for privately computing the intersection and intersection cardinality of certified sets. We begin with an overview before giving complete details.
Overview
Suppose A has S A = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) and B has S B = (b 1 , . . . , b k ). We first sketch a private intersection cardinality protocol where both S A and S B are certified. This protocol will be extended below to compute the actual intersection as well. Suppose f (t) = i=0 α i t i = j=1 (t − a j ) represents S A . G will be the group used for Elgamal homomorphic encryption.
• The CA certifies S A and S B using the method from Section 5.
• A encrypts α i using Elgamal homomorphic encryption (denoted E(·)) under his public key, and proves that this was done correctly. In this same proof A proves holdership of a CL-signature on α i for i = 1, . . . , k, and the cardinality of S A .
• B first verifies the proof that the encryptions of α i were formed correctly and checks the cardinality of S A . B computes w i = E(s i f (b i )) where s i ∈ R Z * q , for each b i ∈ S B using the homomorphic properties of E. A proof is included that w i are computed correctly, that b i are signed and that the cardinality of S B is correct.
• A decrypts w i to get g sif (bi) , and counts how often g sif (bi) = 1; this total is the intersection cardinality.
• A outputs the cardinality to B, and proves it is correct using a verifiable shuffle decryption, as described in §3.4.
Extension to compute S A ∩S B . The following steps can be added to the protocol to provide the intersection, not just its cardinality.
• When B computes w i for all b i ∈ S B , he stores a lookup table mapping
• A decrypts; whenever w i = 1, he proves this to B, who looks up the value (s i , b i ). In this way B learns S A ∩ S B . A must also prove f (b i ) = 0 (when this is the case) to convince B that the entire intersection is output. 
Detailed Description
We now describe the complete protocol, with non-interactive ZK proofs, the details of which are given in Appendix B. Recall that Elgamal ciphertexts have the form E i = (g r , g m h r ). In this section we will refer to the first element of the ciphertext as E i,1 and the second as E i,2 .
Setup:
A has the set S A , represented by f (t) = k i=0 α i t i , certified as in §5. B has the set S B , also certified with the method of §5. A generates the homomorphic Elgamal parameters G and pk A = (g, h) which are made public, and x = log g h kept secret.
Protocol:
4. B verifies P 1 , and aborts if verification fails.
5. B homomorphically evaluates f at elements in S B by computing (b i )) . B stores a table mapping w i ↔ (b i , s i ) (this may be omitted if only the intersection cardinality is desired). 6. B creates the proof
7. B sends (w 1 , . . . , w k , P 2 ) to A. 
11.
A proves that the decryptions of w i are (or are not) equal to zero with the following proof:
12.
A sends C 1 , C y , P 3 to B.
13. B verifies P 3 . (Note also that B must check that P 3 contains the correct number of statements, i.e. that all w i appear in one of C 1 , C y ). 14. For each i such that w i ∈ C 1 , B recovers (s i , b i ) from the lookup table, and adds it to a set X. 15. B sends X to A, which contains S A ∩ S B , and A checks that (a) |X| = |C 1 |, and
If either check fails, A learns that B has output S A ∩ S B incorrectly.
Remark 3. In both steps 11 and 9b when A proves to B that w i is not contain an encryption of zero, it is important that the decrypted value, g sif (bi) , is not revealed since B knows s i . A must therefore blind the ciphertexts in C y (which are not encryptions of zero) as w ui i where u i ∈ R Z * q . Since s i , u i = 0, g siuif (bi) = 1 if and only if f (b i ) = 0, as required.
Security and Privacy
The following theorem (proven in Appendix A) shows that the new protocol securely implements the ideal functionality described in Section 2.
Theorem 1. The protocol of Section 6.2, when constructed with a secure ZK protocol, and an IND-CPA secure homomorphic encryption scheme, is a secure certified private intersection protocol (by Definition 1) assuming the the SRSA assumption holds.
When the homomorphic Elgamal variant is used as the encryptions scheme, security of the protocol relies on the following assumptions: the SRSA assumption in Z * n , the discrete logarithm problem in G, and any additional assumptions required for the security of the zero knowledge proofs.
Adding Fairness
Until this point we have not addressed the question "What if B aborts the protocol after learning S A ∩ S B , but before A does?". The possibility for such an unfair outcome is undesirable in a situation where either A or B may be malicious. In this section we sketch the incorporation of optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocols to the private set intersection protocol of §6.2. An OFE scheme allows A and B to swap two values "simultaneously", i.e. both are guaranteed to receive the value held by the other. A trusted third party is present, but only participates when one party does not complete the protocol (hence the term optimistic). Example OFE schemes are given in the work of Asokan et al. [1] .
To add OFE to our set intersection protocol, we weave two instances of the protocol together, where A and B have opposite roles in each instance. The new protocol is now symmetric, i.e. A and B must perform equivalent operations and communicate equivalent values at the same steps, which are exchanged fairly. Any abort thus results in a fair outcome, where both parties finish with equal knowledge about the other's input set. Using an OFE protocol in such a generic way may yield a protocol with room for improvement; we leave such improvements to future work.
A detailed analysis of the computational and communication costs of our new protocol is given in the extended version of this paper [28] . We count the number of exponentiations required in Z * n (the CL-signature group) and G (the Elgamal group). The dominating computations, evaluating the polynomial, all occur in G. A detailed comparison of our new protocol to a certified version of the FNP protocol and/or the malicious, two-party, non-certified protocol of Kissner and Song [22, Figure 8 ] would be beyond the scope of this work. Communication and computation costs are asymptotically equal, each being O(k 2 ). The constants however, will be significantly smaller since Elgamal parameters are smaller than Paillier parameters providing equivalent security. For 80-bits of security, Paillier with a 1024-bit modulus, yields ciphertexts of 2048 bits. In the Elgamal case we may use the elliptic curve group given by NIST curve P-192 (a curve over F p , where p is a 192-bit prime) [14] . The Elgamal ciphertexts are thus 384 bits, 5.3 times smaller than the equivalent Paillier ciphertext.
In addition to providing faster arithmetic, operating primarily in G allows the protocol to scale to higher security levels. The size of parameters required for Paillier grow quadratically as a function of the security level, while parameters for elliptic curve systems grow linearly (see Lenstra and Verheul [24] ).
Since the ZK proofs are relatively simple, they are good candidates for the batch verification techniques of Bellare, Garay and Rabin [2] . Fast exponentiation and multi-exponentiation techniques (see [3] for a survey) are also applicable, and will improve performance significantly. Implementations may use Horner's rule for polynomial evaluation (as suggested in [15] ). When multiple processing units are available, a parallel polynomial evaluation scheme due to Estrin [12] will further improve performance.
